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Statement Regarding Oral Argument
This case raises issues of exceptional constitutional importance and warrants
oral argument. Among other issues, this case presents the question of whether the
government can constitutionally require communications platforms like Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter not to discriminate against their users based on the viewpoints expressed by those others. The Plaintiffs here claim that these same communications platforms have a First Amendment right to so-discriminate. If the Plaintiffs
are correct, it will have enormous and long-lasting implications for the future of free
speech in the 21st Century, where these communications platforms function in the
Supreme Court’s words as a “modern public square.” Oral argument will assist the
Court in evaluating how these communications platforms’ practices intersect with
First Amendment precedent regarding whether and when private entities have a
right to discriminate against speakers.
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Introduction
The First Amendment protects free speech. But the Plaintiffs (Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter, collectively “the Platforms”) 1 say it also allows them to
squelch free speech. These entities control the “modern public square” and “provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his
or her voice heard.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). But
they discriminate by viewpoint as to who can speak in that square. Texas responded
to this problem with classic anti-discrimination and transparency legislation known
as HB 20, which requires that the Platforms (1) host speakers regardless of their
viewpoint, and (2) disclose purely factual information about how they police their
spaces. The Platforms, however, claim the First Amendment gives them a right to
discriminate freely against viewpoints, without any sunlight.
The Platforms are wrong. “Requiring someone to host another person’s speech
is often a perfectly legitimate thing for the Government to do.” See Agency for Int’l
Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y, Int’l, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2098 (2020) (three-Justice
dissent, offering undisputed summary of Court precedent). The First Amendment
poses no bar because hosting rules govern a host’s “conduct, not [its] speech.” See
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (“FAIR”)
(emphasis added); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). And this

1

Nominally, the Plaintiffs are two trade associations who represent the Platforms. For clarity and simplicity, however, this brief uses the term “Platforms” interchangeably with “Plaintiffs” because Plaintiffs represented below that only Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are affected by the Texas law at issue here. ROA.1306.
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principle has added force when the regulated entities are communications mediums,
like the Platforms. “The First Amendment’s command that government not impede
the freedom of speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure
that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994). It is also well-established that government can require companies to disclose purely factual information about their products. See infra
at 37-38.
The Platforms obtained a preliminary injunction by persuading the lower court
that they are functionally no different than a newspaper or parade—the types of entities that enjoy narrow carveouts from the Supreme Court’s repeated holdings that
government can require enterprises to host speakers equally. Newspapers and parades enjoy this carveout because, among other things, the speech they host is legally
considered their own. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 63. The Platforms operate nothing like that.
On the contrary, they have spent years claiming the speech they host is not their own
in any way. Indeed, their notorious “Section 230” liability shield (47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1)) depends on this claim. This shield has protected the Platforms from billions in liability for third-party content, including even defamatory content and content that aids terrorists. But the Platforms would not be eligible for this shield if they
behaved like newspapers or parades, because the shield explicitly does not apply to a
party who plays any role in developing the underlying speech. For that reason, the
Platforms have repeatedly told courts that they are mere “conduits” for third-party
speech who apply “neutral” tools to help speakers reach their intended audience.
2

Case: 21-51178

Document: 00516222360

Page: 14

Date Filed: 03/02/2022

See infra at 22-23. That forecloses the newspaper/parade analogy. Multiple other
dispositive distinctions foreclose it too. See infra at 23-24. And the Platforms are in
all events subject to common carrier regulation just like the old telegraph and telephone companies—the Platforms’ technological ancestors. HB 20’s anti-discrimination rule is just one item from the menu of regulations that a state can impose on
the Platforms under this historic, well-grounded common carriage framework.
The district court also wrongly enjoined HB 20’s sunlight provisions. Disclosure
rules that require commercial enterprises to convey truthful information to the public about their products almost never offend the First Amendment. We live surrounded by the upshot of that reality everyday—with calorie counts, warning labels,
SEC disclosures, and the like. And there is no dispute that HB 20 requires the Platforms to disclose only truthful information. The district court nevertheless enjoined
this part of the law because compliance would “unduly burden” the Platforms. That
is incorrect as a matter of fact and law, and if upheld it would privilege the Platforms
with a carveout from sunlight provisions that is completely alien to well-developed
disclosure law.
The preliminary injunction also got the equities wrong. HB 20 does not harm
the Platforms in any legally cognizable way. Instead, the anti-discrimination requirement just forces them to live up to representations they have made in Section 230
litigation and to the public. See infra at 6, 14, 22-23. And the disclosure requirements
codify many practices the Platforms already claim to perform. The public interest is
also not served by permitting the Platforms to shield their discriminatory practices
behind the First Amendment. “[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to
3
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preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail,” FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)—not a discriminatory dystopia where large corporations punish speakers with idiosyncratic
views. The Platforms’ loudest champions have open contempt for the First Amendment, and cheer the Platforms’ discrimination as a way to outmaneuver the First
Amendment’s protections. There is also no conceivable interest in allowing the Platforms to continue operating this way without providing truthful explanations to the
public.
The preliminary injunction should be reversed.

Statement of Jurisdiction
The district court entered a preliminary injunction on December 1, 2021.
ROA.2600. The Attorney General timely filed his notice of appeal on December 6,
2021. ROA.2620. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1).

Statement of Issues
1. Whether the Platforms have a First Amendment right to censor third-party user
speech in their spaces on the basis of viewpoint.
2. Whether the Platforms have a First Amendment right not to disclose factual and
uncontroversial information about how they moderate third-party speech in their
spaces.

4
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Statement of the Case
A. The Platforms’ Evolution into Internet Censors
The Platforms are the gatekeepers of a digital “modern public square.” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. They have “enormous influence over the distribution of
news.” Tah v. Glob. Witness Publ’g, 991 F.3d 231, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Silberman,
J., dissenting). And they “provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available
to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
Although other social media entities play important roles in our public life, this appeal concerns only YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook because HB 20 is limited to
platforms with more than 50 million U.S. users. 2
The Platforms are open to the general public and provide a space for private individuals to communicate with one another. ROA.345-46. YouTube is an “online
video hosting platform,” where users can upload videos for others to view. Daniels
v. Alphabet Inc., No. 20-CV-04687, 2021 WL 1222166, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2021). Twitter is a space where users “write short messages, or Tweets, of up to 280
characters . . . and can include photos, videos, and links to other Internet content in
their Tweets.” In re PGS Home Co. Ltd, No. 19-MC-80139, 2019 WL 6311407, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019). And Facebook offers a hybrid where users “can post content on others’ Facebook pages, reshare each other’s content, and send messages to
one another.” Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2019).

2

The district court suggested HB 20 might cover other entities. See ROA.2572.
But the Platforms could not identify other entities that would be covered. ROA.1306.
5
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From their inception until quite recently, the Platforms publicly vowed to be
neutral transmitters of third-party content. See, e.g., Evelyn Douek, Governing Online
Speech: From ‘Posts-as-Trumps’ to Proportionality and Probability, 121 Colum. L. Rev.
759, 769 (2021) (“For the first decade or so, online intermediaries were avowedly
laissez faire about user-generated content.”). Twitter, for example, originally promised it would “not censor user content,” except in “limited circumstances” to
“comply with legal requirements.” 3 And it boasted that it was “the free speech wing
of the free speech party.” 4 The Platforms also disclaimed any interest in editing or
otherwise taking responsibility for the content that others posted to their spaces. As
Facebook put it in 2014: “We try to explicitly view ourselves as not editors . . . We
don’t want to have editorial judgment over the content [users see].” 5
But these early promises were a “bait and switch.” See Fox News, AG Barr on
Tech Companies Censoring Viewpoints: ‘There’s Something Very Disturbing About
What’s Going On’ (June 21, 2020). 6 Once the Platforms achieved digital dominance,
they changed their tune and began to discriminate based on viewpoint. There are

3

See The Internet Archive Wayback Machine, Twitter, The Twitter Rules (Jan.
18, 2009), https://bit.ly/31UlaJx (archived version of old Twitter rules).
4

Josh Halliday, Twitter’s Tony Wang: ‘We are the free speech wing of the free speech
party’, The Guardian (Mar. 22, 2012), https://bit.ly/3dKjXHx.
5

Ravi Somaiya, How Facebook Is Changing the Way Its Users Consume Journalism,
The New York Times (Oct. 27, 2014), https://nyti.ms/3ommZXb.
6
https://fxn.ws/3pFB0Qx.
6
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countless, well-publicized examples, but a few specific ones warrant particular attention. 7
First, the Platforms often discriminate against Americans and in favor of foreign
adversaries. For example, for over a year Facebook censored Americans who suggested the COVID-19 pandemic originated in China’s Wuhan laboratory. 8 Meanwhile, the Platforms allowed Chinese Communist Party officials to claim that America started the virus. 9 The Supreme Leader of Iran has also received preferential
treatment, even though he uses the Platforms to advocate genocide against Israel.
When the Platforms censored U.S. politicians from their services, onlookers were
astonished that Iran’s leader was not treated the same. But Twitter rationalized that

7

News sources are used in limited portions of the background for this brief. The
Attorney General cites news sources instead of record material because the district
court sharply limited discovery before issuing the preliminary injunction. ROA.621.
At “the preliminary injunction stage,” however, the court may consider “otherwise
inadmissible evidence.” Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551
(5th Cir. 1993). The veracity of the examples cited below is also not subject to any
reasonable dispute. Indeed, the Attorney General cited several of these examples in
his motion for stay pending appeal (at 5-6), and the Platforms’ opposition did not
dispute their veracity.
8

See, e.g., Thomas Barrabi, Facebook Ends Ban on Posts Claiming COVID-19 is
Man-made, Fox Business (May 26, 2021), https://fxn.ws/3y0L8qD.
9
See, e.g., Marisa Fernandez, Twitter Fact-Checks Chinese Official’s Claims that
Coronavirus Originated in U.S., Axios (May 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lFWfjM (explaining that Twitter allowed these claims to fester for months and then merely appended a “fact-check” to the claim instead of removing it).
7
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his genocide advocacy was mere “foreign policy saber rattling” and acceptable
“commentary on political issues of the day.” 10
Second, the Platforms offer transparently pretextual explanations for their conduct. For example, in early 2021 an independent journalism organization published
a video of themselves seeking comment from a Facebook executive outside his home
on a story the journalists were running about Facebook’s censorship. Twitter banned
the organization for violating Twitter’s “private information policy” (i.e., appearing
at the Facebook executive’s home). 11 At the same time, however, Twitter allowed a
materially similar CNN video to remain on its platform. CNN’s video shows one of
its reporters approaching a purely private citizen at home to ask if she was aware that
she had interacted with “Russian disinformation” on Facebook. CNN’s video presents the woman’s full name, and even shows her house number (even though this
served no conceivable news purpose). 12 That private citizen now receives death
threats. 13 Nevertheless—and in spite of Twitter’s ostensible “private information

10

See Raphael Ahren, Twitter to MKs: Unlike Trump Tweets, Khamanei’s ‘Eliminate Israel’ Posts Are OK, Times of Israel ( July 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/336th6V;
John Hendel, Twitter CEO: Iranian Leader’s ‘Saber Rattling’ Doesn’t Violate Our Policies, Politico (Oct. 28, 2020), https://politi.co/3GzTdpG.
11

Joseph A. Wulfsohn, Twitter says it permanently suspended Project Veritas, locked
founder James O’Keefe out of his account, Fox News (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://fxn.ws/3BVBojq.
12

Brian Flood, Trump supporter, 76, blames ‘fake news’ CNN for threats following
reporter ambush, Fox News (Feb. 24, 2018), https://fxn.ws/3HpqB23.
13

Id.
8
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policy”—as of this filing, CNN’s video remains live on Twitter and has been viewed
over two million times. 14
Third, the Platforms disallow viewpoints on certain topics that could undermine
federal bureaucrats. As an example, during COVID-19 federal health officials have
repudiated the practice of prescribing drugs “off-label” (i.e., prescribing an FDAapproved drug to treat a condition other than the condition on its labeling). 15 This
stance is in deep tension with federal law, which permits physicians to use their medical judgment to prescribe drugs off-label. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d
149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012). The Platforms have nevertheless aided the federal bureaucrats with censorship. YouTube, for example, proudly boasts that it censors material
“that contradicts . . . health authorities” (it defines this as “misinformation”). 16 Indeed, YouTube even censored a congressional hearing that discussed off-label

14

CNN Tweet (Feb. 20, 2018), archived at perma.cc/VL7Q-6VBF (as of Feb.
23, 2022).
15

See, e.g., CDC Health Advisory (Aug. 26, 2021), https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2021/pdf/CDC_HAN_449.pdf (warning against off-label use
of the drug ivermectin to treat COVID-19); but see Bryant et al., Ivermectin for Prevention and Treatment of COVID-19 Infection, 28 Am. J. Therapeutics 434 (2021)
(meta-analysis of ivermectin usage finding “moderate-certainty evidence . . . that
large reductions in COVID-19 deaths are possible using ivermectin”),
https://bit.ly/3I7yEl4. The Attorney General does not take a position here on
whether ivermectin is effective to treat COVID-19; rather, this shows how the Platforms discriminate by viewpoint and foreclose debate.
16

YouTube
“Covid-19
Medical
Misinformation
https://perma.cc/9ZUK-T2E6 (as of Feb. 28, 2022).
9

Policy,”

Case: 21-51178

Document: 00516222360

Page: 21

Date Filed: 03/02/2022

prescriptions. 17 The stakes for blindly censoring anything “that contradicts” health
bureaucrats is high. As just one example, public records now reveal that senior federal health bureaucrats sought to silence the COVID lab leak hypothesis not because
it was necessarily false, but because its revelation could be politically damaging. 18
These inconsistently applied and sometimes outright misrepresented moderation policies are abusive on their own. But they have taken on particular importance
recently because the Platforms have become willing partners to federal officials who
seek to suppress speech. The White House, for example, admitted in July 2021 that
it is “in regular touch with these social media platforms” and that it “flag[s] problematic posts for Facebook” to censor. White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary
Jen Psaki and Surgeon General Dr. Vivek H. Murthy (July 15, 2021). On the following
day, the White House was asked if it found “sufficient” the fact that Facebook had
“removed 18 million pieces of COVID misinformation.” The White House responded: “Clearly not”; i.e., that the Platforms had not censored enough. White
House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki (July 16, 2021).

17

Ron Johnson, YouTube Cancels the U.S. Senate, Wall St. J. (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://on.wsj.com/303Il3E.
18

Letter from Ranking Members on Committee on Oversight and Reform to Xavier Becerra at App’x. 4 ( Jan. 11, 2022), https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Letter-Re.-Feb-1-Emails011122.pdf (National Institutes of Health Director privately fearing that lab leak hypothesis could “do[] great potential harm to science and international harmony”).
10
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B. HB 20
Texas has a “fundamental interest in protecting the free exchange of ideas and
information in [Texas].” ROA.66 (HB 20 text). Accordingly, Texas passed HB 20
in 2021 to regulate the Platforms and combat the abuses described supra at 6-10.
HB 20 narrowly defines the entities subject to its reach. It covers only “social
media platform[s]” with 50 million U.S. users. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.002.
A “social media platform” is an Internet website or application that permits all persons to join and primarily facilitates users sharing content with others. Id. § 120.001.
The definition does not include dissimilar companies like Internet service providers,
email providers, or websites that primarily disseminate news that is not generated by
users. Id. Texas has statutorily deemed covered entities to be “common carriers.”
ROA.66.
Substantively, HB 20 does two main things. First, the Act contains a modest
anti-discrimination provision. Specifically, the Platforms must host speakers on
equal terms; they may not “censor” based on user “viewpoint” or user location in
Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.002 (the “Hosting Rule”). “Censor”
includes total removal of content, and also other manipulations that can have a comparable effect. Id. § 143A.001(a). HB 20 does not, however, prohibit removal of entire categories of “content.” So, for example, the Platforms may decide to eliminate
pornography without violating HB 20. HB 20 also does not affect whether the Platforms can continue to discriminate in certain narrow, confined spaces, specifically
regarding: (a) content federal law specifically authorizes censorship of; (b) unlawful
content; (c) content concerning sexual exploitation of children, or harassment of
11
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sexual abuse survivors; and (d) content that incites criminal activity or violence in
various ways. Id. § 143A.006(a). The Platforms are also permitted to censor anything
that a user wishes to be censored from that user’s own account. Id. § 143A.006(b).
Users and the Attorney General can enforce the Hosting Rule but cannot seek damages. Id. §§ 143A.007(a), 143A.008.
Second, the Act requires various purely factual disclosures. The Platforms must
(1) describe how they moderate and manage content, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 120.051, (2) publish an “acceptable use policy” informing users what content is
permitted and how content is policed, id. § 120.052, and (3) publish a biannual transparency report documenting certain facts about how the Platform managed content
during a specific time period, id. § 120.053. HB 20 also requires the Platforms to
maintain a mechanism that allows users to make the Platforms live up to their disclosures: specifically, Platforms must maintain a complaint-and-appeal system for users
who believe action contrary to the disclosures has taken place, id. § 120.101-104. The
Attorney General can enforce these requirements but cannot seek damages. Id.
§ 120.151.
Finally, HB 20 has a robust severability provision. ROA.79-81.

C. Section 230
HB 20 is Texas’s answer to the problems described supra at 6-10. Section 230,
47 U.S.C. § 230, however, is the leading federal law governing the Platforms, and it
is also highly relevant to this case. Section 230 provides the Platforms with an important legal shield, and the Platforms’ use of that shield provides critical context for
their challenge to HB 20.
12
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Section 230 was enacted in the Internet’s early days against the backdrop of two
cases that raised difficult questions about Internet platform liability for hosted content. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing the history). Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), held that an Internet platform was not liable for
transmitting a third party’s defamatory speech. But then Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), held that an
Internet platform could be liable for transmitting defamatory third-party speech
where, unlike with Cubby, the platform filters some third-party speech. Together
these cases created a Hobson’s choice: “[O]nline service providers that voluntarily
filter some messages become liable for all messages transmitted, whereas providers
that bury their heads in the sand and ignore problematic posts altogether escape liability.” Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1163. A perverse consequence resulted: It is too
hard to filter all content, so, given this choice, Internet platforms would have to filter
none of it—including pornographic or arguably even illegal content.
This Hobson’s choice was a “serious obstacle[] to the important federal policy
of empowering parents to determine the content of communications their children
receive” online. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). Internet platforms literally could not safely filter pornography away from child users without potentially
running into the Stratton Oakmont problem, where they become liable for everything
they fail to filter. In 1996, Congress responded with Section 230. First, Congress
codified Cubby by establishing a default rule that Internet entities cannot be “treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another.” 47 U.S.C.
13
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§ 230(c)(1). Second, Congress overrode Stratton Oakmont and provided that the default rule does not change simply because a platform filters certain kinds of odious
content, so long as that filtering is done “in good faith.” Id. § 230(c)(2). Third, Congress confirmed that an Internet platform “remains liable for its own speech,” Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007), including
when it has any role in the formation of another’s speech, see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f )(3)
(platform liable for content it creates or develops “in whole or in part”).
The Platforms have aggressively leveraged the Section 230 shield. For example,
they successfully raised the shield against claims for aiding Hamas and ISIS terrorists
notwithstanding that those terror groups openly use the Platforms to advance their
deadly missions. See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 65-66; Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th
871, 882 (9th Cir. 2021). Necessarily, in these actions the Platforms must take the
position that they themselves have no role in the “creation or development” of the
terrorists’ content. See, e.g., Brief for Facebook as Defendants-Appellees at 1, Klayman v. Zuckerberg, No. 13-7017, 2013 WL 5371995 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2013) (Facebook arguing Section 230 protects it as a “conduit[] for others’ speech”). If, by contrast, they were the editors of the terrorist content, they would indisputably be liable.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f )(3); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398,
408 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a website operator is in part responsible for the . . . content,
then it is . . . not immune from claims predicated on it.”).

D. Procedural History
On September 22, 2021, in a dramatic reversal from this position, the Platforms
sued the Texas Attorney General under the First Amendment to enjoin HB 20’s
14
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enforcement, principally on the grounds that it interferes with their editorial control
of the speech third parties post to their spaces.
On December 1 the district court entered a preliminary injunction. The district
court concluded that HB 20’s Hosting Rule likely violates the First Amendment by
infringing the Platforms’ ability to “exercise editorial discretion over their platform’s content.” ROA.2586. And the court deemed the disclosure requirements
“inordinately burdensome.” ROA.2591. The court also concluded the law was problematic on additional grounds such as that the Hosting Rule contains exemptions,
and because it does not apply to smaller Internet entities. ROA.2597-98. Finally, the
court concluded that HB 20 was not properly tailored because “the State could have
created its own unmoderated platform.” ROA.2598.
On December 15, 2021, the Attorney General filed a motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. That motion remains pending as of this filing.

Standard of Review
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. In addition to proving a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the movant must demonstrate a substantial
threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; the threatened injury outweighs any harm that will result to the non-movant if the injunction is granted, and
the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 894 F.3d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 2018). “A grant of a preliminary
injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion,” with “legal conclusions” “reviewed
de novo.” Id.

15
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Summary of Argument
I.

The Platforms are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that

HB 20’s Hosting Rule violates the First Amendment. Laws requiring commercial
entities to neutrally host speakers generally do not even implicate the First Amendment because they do not regulate the host’s speech at all—they regulate its conduct. The Platforms tip their hand by resisting the Hosting Rule with only outlier
precedent about newspapers and parades, forcing the Platforms to compare themselves to entities they are materially unlike. Among many other dispositive distinctions, the Platforms enjoy Section 230 protection for their users’ speech under the
premise that the Platforms are mere conduits for that speech with no responsibility
for its content. That is irreconcilable with their claim that they should enjoy the separate privileges afforded to newspapers, who are legally responsible for the content
they print. And even if the Platforms could invoke some legitimate First Amendment
right to discriminate among speakers, the Hosting Rule is a common carriage regulation that can abrogate that right, and is subject to at most intermediate scrutiny
which it survives.
II.

The Platforms are also unlikely to succeed on their argument that HB

20’s disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment. HB 20 requires the Platforms to disclose only purely factual information about their products. And it is wellestablished that the government may require commercial entities to issue factual and
uncontroversial disclosures in these circumstances provided that the disclosures
would not be “unduly burdensome.” Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup.
Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). The district court erred because it concluded
16
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that the sheer volume of information the Platforms may have to disclose under HB
20 rendered the requirements unduly burdensome. That was wrong, and if upheld it
would call into question countless long-operative disclosure requirements (such as
SEC reporting requirements) that even the Platforms are not bold enough to question. The district court’s conclusion was also wrong because it overlooked that the
Platforms have repeatedly advocated for the type of disclosure framework that HB 20
imposes—so it cannot plausibly “unduly burden” them.
III.

The equities also disfavor the Platforms. Texas suffers irreparable harm

as a matter of law while HB 20 is enjoined. Meanwhile, HB 20’s implementation
would not impose any legitimate harm on the Platforms. The law forces them to operate in ways materially similar to how they did in the past, and to honor promises
they have made to the public and the judiciary in Section 230 litigation. They also
suffer no genuine First Amendment harm. Instead, the Platforms seek to use the
First Amendment to subvert the First Amendment’s core guarantee. Finally, the
public interest demonstrably favors reversal because the “widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).

Argument
I. The Platforms Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Claim
that the Hosting Rule Violates the First Amendment.
A. The Hosting Rule does not implicate the First Amendment.
HB 20’s Hosting Rule is constitutional. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that “[r]equiring someone to host another person’s speech is often a perfectly
17
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legitimate thing for the Government to do.” Agency for Int’l Dev., 140 S.Ct. at 2098
(three-Justice dissent making undisputed assertion). That is because hosting is a
form of “conduct, not speech.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 60. This rule applies with full
force to the Platforms.
1.

The Supreme Court’s canonical PruneYard decision demonstrates why the

Platforms have no First Amendment defense to the Hosting Rule. PruneYard involved a large California shopping mall that barred visitors from engaging in expressive activity not “directly related to [the mall’s] commercial purposes.” 447 U.S. at
77. The mall applied this policy against students pamphleteering regarding a highly
charged subject: Zionism. Id. But California law forced shopping malls to play host
to political speech, and to generally honor the public’s “speech and petition” rights.
Id. at 78. The relevant question presented to the Supreme Court, then, was whether
California’s law violated any “First Amendment right not to be forced by the State
to use [private] property as a forum for the speech of others.” Id. at 85.
The Court concluded that California’s hosting requirement presented no First
Amendment problem, for three specific reasons. First, the shopping center was
“open to the public to come and go as they please”—for this reason, no onlooker
would associate a pamphleteer’s views with those of the mall owner. Id. at 87. Second, California was not mandating that the mall host a “specific message”; instead,
the State protection applied equally to all speakers. Id. (emphasis added). Third, the
mall remained free to “expressly disavow any connection with” a disfavored message. Id.; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 57980 (1995) (explaining the PruneYard outcome on these grounds). Every Justice
18
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agreed—some concurred merely to say that small retail establishments might be different. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 96-97 (Powell, J., concurring).
In all legally relevant respects, the Platforms here are like the mall in PruneYard.
First, the Platforms concede they are open to all comers. See ROA.345-46. Second,
HB 20 does not dictate any specific message that the Platforms must host—instead,
it requires them to stop discriminating based on viewpoint across the board. See supra
at 11-12. And third, the Platforms remain free under HB 20 to expressly disavow any
connection with disfavored messages—indeed, they already do this frequently. See,
e.g., Facebook, Terms of Service § 4.3, https://perma.cc/HK4X-QPL8 (as of Dec.
13, 2021) (“We do not control or direct what people and others do or say, and we are
not responsible for their actions or conduct . . . or any content they share.”); Twitter, Terms of Service § 3, https://perma.cc/2QCU-VLW4 (as of Dec. 13, 2021)
(similar); see also, e.g., Twitter, Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information
(May 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/K8CT-NQHZ (Twitter explaining it appends its
own messages to content it deems “misleading,” or “harmful”).
The Supreme Court’s FAIR decision unanimously re-affirmed PruneYard and
clarified that a speech-hosting requirement generally regulates the host’s “conduct,
not speech.” 547 U.S. at 60. In FAIR, Congress required universities to host military
recruiters on the same terms as they hosted nonmilitary recruiters. 547 U.S. 47.
Some law schools sharply “object[ed]” to the military’s policy on sexual orientation.
Id. at 52. Nevertheless, the Court concluded this conduct regulation “does not sufficiently interfere with any message of [a] school” to trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 64. That was because the hosting obligation only “affect[ed] what law
19
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schools must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or
may not say.” Id. at 60. So it is here: the Hosting Rule affects only what the Platforms
“must do”—refrain from engaging in viewpoint discrimination—“not what they
may or may not say.” Id.
2. The district court relied on inapposite precedent to conclude that this generally applicable hosting doctrine does not apply to the Platforms and that instead
“the First Amendment guarantees social media platforms the right to exercise editorial discretion” over third-party content. ROA.2582. The district court claimed
that “[t]hree Supreme Court cases” command this conclusion. ROA.2582; see also
ROA.272 (Platforms featuring same three cases). That was wrong.
The Platforms’ flagship case is one about the rights of newspapers. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). There, a Florida statute forced newspapers to give politicians “equal space to reply to criticism and attacks” that the
newspaper prints. Id. at 243. The Florida Attorney General had never defended the
statute, id. at 247 n.7, but a politician sought to use it to compel a newspaper to print
his message verbatim in response to critical editorials, id. at 243-44. The Supreme
Court concluded the statute was unconstitutional. The First Amendment’s “free
press clause” protects the “choice of material to go into a newspaper.” Id. at 254
n.20, 258. That is because newspapers function as “more than a passive receptable
or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.” Id. at 258. So it was unconstitutional for Florida to tell newspapers that they had to print a specific speaker’s speech.
Tornillo is inapposite right from the start because the Hosting Rule is nothing
like Florida’s right-of-reply statute. The Hosting Rule is a generally applicable anti20
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discrimination requirement—not a special privilege available only for politicians, as
in Tornillo. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (upholding California requirement that
malls host speakers because the requirement was neutral and generally applicable).
Even a newspaper’s “choice of material” to print, Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258, does not
override general anti-discrimination law. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding against First Amendment challenge a rule that newspapers not carry “help-wanted” advertisements in a
way that discriminated on the basis of sex). The Platforms have in the past revealed
they are laboring under a severe misimpression; they think newspapers (and, by extension under their logic, the Platforms themselves) can discriminate against anyone,
for any reason. See Taylor v. Twitter, Inc., Tr. Hr’g, No. CGC-18-564460 (Cal. Super.
Ct. S.F. Cnty., June 14, 2018) (Twitter counsel: “[T]he First Amendment would
give Twitter the right, just like it would give a newspaper the right, to choose not to
run an op-ed page from someone because she happens to be a woman.”). 19 But they
are wrong; “application of [anti-discrimination law] to newspapers does not contravene freedom of press protected by the First Amendment.” United States v. Hunter,
459 F.2d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 1972).
In addition, the Platforms are not entitled to the same treatment as newspapers
because they differ from newspapers in at least three dispositive respects.

19

The Court pressed counsel whether that was truly Twitter’s position. Court:
“[Y]our position is absolutist; that Twitter has an absolute First Amendment right
to remove anybody from its platform, even if doing so would be discriminatory on
the basis of religion, gender[?]” Twitter’s counsel responded unequivocally: “Yes.”
21
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First, unlike newspapers, the Platforms are “a conduit for news, comment, and
advertising.” Cf. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. Their Section 230 protection depends on
it. To use Section 230’s shield the Platforms must not “develop[]” the underlying
content, not even merely “in part.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f )(3). Thus, while they
are not liable for purely third-party speech, they are “liable for [their] own speech,”
Universal Commc’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 419, including “speech that is properly attributed to them,” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,
254 (4th Cir. 2009). That is why they repeatedly tell courts in Section 230 litigation
that they are mere “conduits for others’ speech” with no responsibility for its content. Appellees’ Br. at 1, Klayman, 2013 WL 5371995; see also Twitter Motion to Dismiss, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00213, 2016 WL 2586923 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
6, 2016) (Twitter arguing it should be treated akin to “conduit for huge quantities of
third-party speech”); Motion to Dismiss Reply, Colon v. Twitter, Google, and Facebook, No. 6:18-CV-00515, 2019 WL 7835413 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2019) (all three
Platforms asserting they use “neutral tools [to] filter or arrange third-party content”
and they do not “creat[e]” or “develop[]” any third-party content). Courts have
taken them at their word. See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 70 (Facebook not liable for terrorist content because it was mere “neutral intermediary” for the content); Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Garland, J.) (YouTube’s parent not liable for advertising conspiracy where its “neutral
algorithm” produced the violative content). Newspapers, by contrast, can “not defend a [tort] suit on the ground that the [tortious] statements are not its own.” Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 386; see also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring)
22
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(“[A]lthough a newspaper may publish without government censorship, it has never
been entirely free from liability for what it chooses to print.”). That should take
Tornillo and the newspaper analogy off the table entirely.
Second, “unlike newspapers,” the Platforms “hold themselves out as organizations that focus on distributing the speech of the broader public.” Biden v. Knight
First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring). That is the
whole reason they were created. See Testimony of Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg
before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Oct. 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3LjY8Ot (“Facebook was built to enable people to express themselves and share.”). This feature makes the Platforms even more
of a host than the PruneYard shopping mall, which was “open to the public to come
and go as they please,” but not built for the specific purpose of hosting speech. 447
U.S. at 87. Relatedly, the Platforms do not pre-screen content before they disseminate it. Indeed, “[s]omething well north of 99%” of the third-party speech the Platforms disseminate “never gets reviewed” even after dissemination. NetChoice, LLC
v. Moody, 546 F. Supp.3d 1082 (N.D. Fla. 2021). A newspaper could not operate this
way because it would risk substantial defamation and other liability. And for this reason, among others, no reasonable viewer would associate the content third-parties
post with the Platforms themselves. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65 (no First Amendment
problem with hosting rule where there is “little likelihood” that third-party speech
“would be identified with the owner”).
Third, unlike newspapers, the “space constraints on digital platforms are practically nonexistent.” Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
23
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FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64 (distinguishing Tornillo because “compelled printing of a reply
takes up space that could be devoted to other material” (cleaned up)); cf. Tornillo,
418 U.S. at 257 (reasoning that newspapers cannot “proceed to infinite expansion of
its column space to accommodate” unwanted speech). So, whereas a newspaper
must by necessity curate what appears on its pages, no similar practical impediment
exists for the Platforms. As a result, they host the speech of billions of users worldwide.
3. Plaintiffs’ two other main cases—Hurley, 515 U.S. 557, and Pacific Gas &
Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(“PG&E”)—are not even in the ballpark. Hurley merely extended Tornillo to a parade. A parade could not be compelled to include unwelcome marchers because a
parade is “inherent[ly] expressive[]”—unwelcome marchers would “alter the expressive content of the[] parade,” and viewers would likely assume the parade organizers endorsed the rogue marchers. 515 U.S. at 568, 572-73, 575; see Agency for
Int’l Dev., 140 S. Ct. at 2088 (explaining that Hurley was decided on “speech
misattribution” grounds). Hurley distinguished the PruneYard shopping mall on
terms that apply with equal force to the Platforms: unlike the parade, the mall was
open to all comers, would not be associated with third-party speech, and could “disavow any connection with the [unwanted] message.” 515 U.S. at 579-80.
And in PG&E, the Court merely held that a California regulator could not order
an electric utility to add a specific advocacy group’s messages to the utility’s customer newsletter, where the advocacy group’s messages would disparage the electric
company. See 475 U.S. at 12 (“The [California agency] order does not simply award
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access to the public at large; rather, it discriminates on the basis of the viewpoints of
the selected speakers.”) (plurality op.). The electric company was also markedly different than the mall in PruneYard (and the Platforms here) because it had not opened
itself—much less its customer mailings—to the world at large. Id. at 12 n.8 (plurality
op.).

B. The Hosting Rule is also a historically-grounded common carriage
regulation, and is subject to at most intermediate scrutiny which it
survives.
Even if the Platforms enjoy a First Amendment right to discriminate based on
user viewpoint (they do not), the Hosting Rule is nevertheless a permissible form of
common carrier regulation. Texas has a demonstrable interest in preserving its residents’ ability to communicate and receive information on these modern-day equivalents of yesteryear’s communications common carriers. The Hosting Rule is also
subject, at most, to intermediate scrutiny which it survives.
1. A “common carrier has a duty to serve.” Refrigerated Transp. Co. v. ICC,
616 F.2d 748, 753 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). What this customarily means is
that the carrier “can make no discrimination between persons,” and is “bound to
accept all goods offered within the course of his employment.” York Co. v. Cent.
R.R., 70 U.S. 107, 112 (1865) (stating the common law rule); VIA Metro. Transit v.
Meck, 620 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. 2020) (Texas adopts “common law” treatment of
common carriers). For communications providers, this means that the carrier must,
“to the extent of capacity,” “transmit” all messages “upon reasonable terms.”
Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 14 (1894); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v.
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James, 162 U.S. 650, 651 (1896) (affirming enforcement of state law that required
“telegraph compan[ies]” to “transmit and deliver [messages] with impartiality and
good faith”). This settled understanding has governed for over 100 years—no court
has adopted the argument that the First Amendment swallows common carrier principles for this entire industry just because speech is in play. Cf. e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201202 (codified version of common carriage requirements for communications providers).
Common carrier treatment is fully applicable here. The Texas Legislature has
defined the Platforms as “common carriers.” ROA.66. That was plainly proper under the term’s common law meaning. The touchstone trait of a common carrier is
“a holding out on the part of the operator . . . a willingness to carry on the same terms
and conditions any and all groups no matter who they might be.” Semon v. Royal
Indem. Co., 279 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1960); see also NARUC v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630,
641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (common carrier is one who does not “make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal”). That is how the
Platforms have held themselves out to the public. ROA.346 (Platforms concededly
willing to accept any user who agrees to their boilerplate terms of service); ROA.1227
(users can open account immediately upon accepting generic terms of service). Historically, courts have considered some other factually sensitive factors about
whether an entity is properly considered a common carrier—such as whether their
business implicates a “public interest.” See Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1222-23 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). But these factors also overwhelmingly point in the direction that the
Platforms are properly considered common carriers. See id. at 1224 (Thomas, J.,
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concurring) (“There is a fair argument that some digital platforms are sufficiently
akin to common carriers.”); ROA.1114-16 (expert report explaining why the Platforms are akin to historical common carriers). And the Hosting Rule imposes a classic common carrier obligation on the Platforms: no discrimination.
2. The district court concluded that the Platforms are not common carriers by
confusing (1) the traditional definition of a common carrier with (2) the traditional
obligations of a common carrier. Specifically, the district court concluded that the
Platforms are not common carriers because they “screen[] and sometimes moderate[] or curate[]” user content. ROA.2585. But that has nothing to do with whether
they fit the traditional definition of a common carrier; all it says is that the Platforms
violate the traditional obligations of a common carrier. The touchstone trait of a common carrier is the holding out of oneself as willing to deal with all comers on equal
terms without individualized bargaining. See supra at 26. That plainly describes the
Platforms. Cf. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 1981) (“A
carrier will not be a common carrier where its practice is to make individualized decisions in particular cases as to whether and on what terms to serve.”); Harper v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 905 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1990) (car rental company not a
common carrier where it “merely sought to accommodate a particular customer’s
needs” by offering one of its employees to drive the particular customer (emphasis
added)). The district court’s conclusion makes the common carrier test circular: it
would allow entities to circumvent common carrier rules simply by violating those
rules. That is wrong; otherwise telephone companies could have skirted their
longstanding common carriage obligations, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202, simply by
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combing their records for disfavored speakers and then terminating those speakers’
phone service. No one has ever thought the telephone companies had a constitutional right to operate in that abusive way.
3. Regardless, however, of whether the Platforms are properly considered
common carriers, the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Turner Broadcasting saga
demonstrate that common carriage treatment may be imposed on them, even if it affects some of their First Amendment rights (it does not). See Turner Broad. Sys. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (“Turner I”); Turner Broad. Sys., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180
(1997) (“Turner II”).
The Turner cases involved the Cable Act’s requirement that cable television operators reserve over one third of their channels for specific speakers—local broadcasters—at the expense of other cable programmers that the cable operators wanted
to host. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 630-32. The Court concluded that the requirement implicated the First Amendment in “two respects” because (unlike here) it “reduce[d]
the number of channels over which cable operators exercise unfettered control” and
had “render[ed] it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on
the limited channels” not reserved for local broadcasters. Id. at 637; see also id. at 679
(O’Connor, J., dissenting in part) (remaining four Justices likewise concluding
“[t]he controversial judgment at the heart of the statute is . . . that broadcasters
should be preferred over cable programmers”). Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that the requirement was subject only to “intermediate scrutiny,” which it survived
because it properly advanced the government’s interest in the “widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.” Turner II, 520
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U.S. at 189, 192 (concluding this dissemination is “essential to the welfare of the
public”).
Four Justices, including Justice Thomas, dissented on the view that the Cable
Act requirement went too far. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 684-85 (O’Connor, J., dissenting
in part). The dissenters’ specific problem was that Congress “preferr[ed] one
speaker” (the local broadcasters) “to another” (the cable programmers competing
for the same cable space). Id. Forcing a carrier to play favorites goes beyond traditional common carriage regulation. But even these dissenters explicitly recognized that
traditional common carriage treatment was likely appropriate: “[I]t stands to reason that
if Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common carriers, it
can ask the same of cable companies.” Id.
4. There is no need to apply even Turner’s intermediate scrutiny here because
HB 20’s Hosting Rule does not infringe speech rights in any respect (it does not, for
example, pit one group of speakers against another, as in Turner). But even if intermediate scrutiny applied, the Hosting Rule would easily survive.
Like the Cable Act in Turner, the Hosting Rule’s operation “does not depend
upon the content of the [regulated party’s]” speech. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 64344. For that reason, intermediate scrutiny (at most) is appropriate. That means the
Hosting Rule survives if (1) “it advances important governmental interests,” that
(2) are “unrelated to the suppression of free speech,” and (3) “do[] not burden substantially more speech than necessary.” Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189. The Hosting Rule
easily passes this test. See, e.g., Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1222-26 (Thomas, J., concurring)
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(lone remaining Turner dissenter concluding that this type of social media regulation
is likely constitutional).
First, the Hosting Rule advances Texas’s demonstrably compelling “interest in
protecting the free exchange of ideas and information.” HB 20 § 1(2); Turner II, 520
U.S. at 192 (“widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public”).
Second, the Hosting Rule is plainly unrelated to the suppression of free expression, see Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662, since the bill aims to enable more speech than what
the Platforms prefer under the status quo.
Third, the Hosting Rule does not burden substantially more speech than necessary. To the extent it burdens the Platforms at all, that burden “is congruent to the
benefits it affords” to Platform users. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 215. Indeed, under
Turner Texas could have gone substantially further. HB 20 applies only to the largest
social media platforms—those with 50 million or more U.S. users. By contrast, the
law in Turner applied to all cable operators with more than 12 channels, and even
those with 12 or fewer channels were still subject to some obligations. See Turner I,
512 U.S. at 630-32. The Platforms subject to HB 20 also have shown an overwhelming tendency to censor. See supra at 6-10. The Turner cable operators by contrast
would still host “the vast majority” of traditional broadcasters even “in the absence
of any legal obligation to do so.” Turner II, 520 U.S. at 215.
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C. The District Court’s and the Platforms’ alternative bases to enjoin
the Hosting Rule fail.
The district court’s and the Platforms’ other asserted grounds for the injunction
are likewise fatally flawed.
1. The District Court’s alternative First Amendment grounds were error.
The district court wrongly concluded that HB 20 “discriminates based on content and speaker” because it contains minor carveouts that let the Platforms continue to viewpoint-censor in a few limited areas. ROA.2592-93. Most of the carveouts are for illegal content, or where the Platforms can invoke a federal censorship
right. See supra at 11-12. And the carveouts present no First Amendment problem
because the mere allowance for Platforms to keep restricting speech (in limited areas)
does not mean the law itself restricts any speech. The Court blessed the same structure in Turner—the cable companies continued to exercise almost complete control
over the majority of their channels, and, even for the channels the Cable Act regulated, Congress permitted the cable companies to discriminate in their “discretion”
between local broadcasters. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 216. So the cable companies still
had ample ability to discriminate based on content. But that did not mean the Cable
Act was content-based. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 643-44 (intermediate scrutiny appropriate because Congress’s “interference does not depend upon the content of the
cable operators’ programming”). Likewise here, HB 20’s limited carveouts permitting the Platforms to keep censoring among certain content does not mean HB 20
censors that content. In any event, if these carveouts are problematic, they are fully
severable. See HB 20 § 8 (explicit severability provision); Barr v. Am. Ass’n of

31

Case: 21-51178

Document: 00516222360

Page: 43

Date Filed: 03/02/2022

Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2352-55 (2020) (severing “unconstitutional discriminatory exception” to otherwise valid statute under First Amendment).
The district court also concluded that the law has an impermissible purpose because it targets only big tech companies while leaving untouched smaller websites
that individual Texas legislators allegedly liked. ROA.2593-94. There are multiple
fatal problems with this conclusion. First, it is completely unfounded: The District
Court’s conclusion was based principally on a news article that does not even purport to present the views of a single Texas legislator. ROA.2593. The article instead
simply asserted that some social media entities that did not meet HB 20’s 50 million
U.S. user threshold are generally more liked by free speech advocates than the Platforms. The district court impermissibly leaped from this newspaper assertion to the
conclusion that Texas’s legislators deliberately opted to give these smaller entities
preferential treatment. Second, the district court’s conclusion completely ignores
that HB 20 applies to the Platforms and not smaller entities because the Platforms
present the most salient problem. These are the largest social media enterprises in
the world, and they demonstrably engage in rampant viewpoint-based censorship.
See supra at 5-10. It may create constitutional problems if the law were broader and
targeted smaller platforms (many of whom may not even discriminate based on user
viewpoint). PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 96-97 (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing doubt
whether hosting rules could be applied to small establishments). Third, even if the
district court had identified legitimate evidence that an individual legislator was motivated to exempt their favored speakers, that would not affect HB 20’s validity. See
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United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (courts do not “void a statute
that is . . . constitutional on its face, on the basis of what [some] Congressmen said
about it”).
The district court also suggested that HB 20 is not properly tailored because
“the State could have created its own unmoderated platform” instead. ROA.2598.
That cannot possibly be the law. For decades Congress has imposed common carriage regulation on wide swaths of the communications industry, including telephony, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202, and not once was this called into question on the basis
that Congress instead could have created its own national communications network.
There is a fortune waiting for any company that creates a successful alternative to
the Platforms. See Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring). It is quite telling
that none have yet succeeded. Id. And it makes no sense to force the government to
try to compete with the Platforms when even private, profit-motivated industry cannot figure out how. 20
2. The Platforms cannot seek shelter in Section 230.
As explained supra at 13-14, Section 230(c)(1) provides that Internet platforms
cannot be held liable for users’ speech. Because the Platforms deploy that legal shield
as a matter of course, they cannot at the same time claim the same rights as

20

The court also issued conflicting findings regarding vagueness. It first expressed that it would “not reach the issue[] of whether HB 20 is void for vagueness,”
ROA.2581 n.1, then concluded HB 20 is “[u]nconstitutionally [v]ague,” ROA.2594,
but then explained correctly that most provisions of the law are not vague (none are),
ROA.2594-96.
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newspapers and parades. See supra at 22-23. Section 230, however, contains another
important provision here; specifically, Section 230(c)(2) provides that the shield still
holds even if an Internet platform removes some user speech. See supra at 14 (explaining how this provision was designed to overrule Stratton Oakmont, which held
an Internet platform liable for all hosted speech on the basis that it filtered some).
The Platforms argued below that Section 230(c)(2) additionally confers a freestanding censorship privilege that defeats independent legal duties having nothing to do
with liability for user speech—including anti-discrimination laws like HB 20. That is
wrong for multiple reasons.
First, history and text show that Section 230(c)(2) does not protect Internet platforms from independent legal duties, like anti-discrimination laws. After all,
230(c)(2) merely overrode Stratton Oakmont’s error of treating an Internet platform
that removed some content as the speaker of all third-party content. See supra at 14.
HB 20 does not do that. Indeed, HB 20 does not hold the Platforms liable for any
third-party content. And that is the only problem 230(c)(2) addressed. Section
230(c)(2)’s text confirms this because it protects Internet platforms only from being
“held liable on account of” censoring content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis
added). When a Platform is subject to an anti-discrimination law it is not being held
liable “on account of” censorship—the Platform is liable if it commits the legally distinct wrong of discrimination. It would strain credulity to say Section 230 protects
Platforms when they censor speakers based on race. Likewise here, Section 230 does
not protect them for censoring based on speaker viewpoint.
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Second, Section 230(c)(2) is altogether inapplicable unless the removal is done
“in good faith.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). Viewpoint-based censorship is almost never
“in good faith,” and at a bare minimum presents a highly fact-dependent question
that cannot be resolved in this pre-enforcement challenge. See supra at 6-10 (documenting egregious different treatment).
Third, Section 230(c)(2) does not cover all removals—only removal of content
considered “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). The catch-all “otherwise objectionable” must be interpreted with reference to the “words immediately surrounding” it.
See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality op.). But the Platforms
censor substantial speech that does not plausibly fit any of these buckets. See, e.g.,
supra at 6-10.
Fourth, grave First Amendment problems would emerge if the Court reads Section 230(c)(2) to protect the Platforms from any form of State law liability for censorship. HB 20 is designed to promote freedom of speech. If Section 230 is interpreted to preempt HB 20, then it would constitute an “abridg[ement]” of “freedom
of speech” under First Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I. Granted, HB 20 protects
“freedom of speech” to a greater extent than the First Amendment, because it restricts private actors and not just the government. But that does not mean Congress
may permissibly abrogate it. See Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32
(1956) (applying First Amendment scrutiny to federal preemption of state law that
advanced associational rights).
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3. A final overarching theme warrants attention. The Platforms profess to censor only reprehensible or false speech. ROA.272. If that were true, their policies
might be more publicly palatable, but it would score them no legal points. “Our political system and cultural life rest upon th[e] ideal” that “each person should decide
for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration,
and adherence.” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641. “[S]peech cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458
(2011); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (this is a “bedrock principle”).
Indeed, it is “startling and dangerous” even to suggest as much. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). The First Amendment simply does not create different rules for fringe or even reprehensible speech. See Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v.
Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). (The Attorney General recognizes
that the First Amendment does not itself force the Platforms, as private parties, to
cease censoring on viewpoint—that is what the Hosting Rule does. The First
Amendment, however, embodies broader societal values that have force regardless
of whether government or private party is performing the censorship).
But the Platforms do not just restrict uniformly condemned or false information.
They are razing free speech’s foundation. Far from policing “misinformation,” the
Platforms censor factual debates on hotly disputed matters of tremendous, bona fide
public interest. See, e.g., supra at 7-10 (describing the Platforms’ censorship of information regarding COVID-19’s origin and potential treatment). They even prohibit
speech simply because it contradicts government bureaucrats. See supra at 9-10; cf.
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Harcourt, Brace & Co. ed., 1949). And they
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do not even consistently remove reprehensible speech; after all, they let internationally prominent anti-Semites loudly advocate for Israel’s extermination. See supra at
6-7. The Platforms are forcing the once unthinkable question whether the First
Amendment protects the destruction of free speech. For all of the reasons explained
supra, the answer is no.

II. The Platforms Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Claim
that HB 20’s Disclosure Rules Violate the First Amendment.
The District Court also erred by preliminarily enjoining HB 20’s disclosure provisions.
A. As explained supra at 12, HB 20 imposes sunlight on the Platforms through
multiple, fine-tuned disclosure requirements. The Platforms must:
(1) Describe how they moderate and manage content, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 120.051;
(2) Publish an “acceptable use policy” informing users what content is permitted and how content is policed, id. § 120.052;
(3) Publish a biannual transparency report documenting certain facts about how
the Platform managed content during a specific time period, id. § 120.053; and
(4) Permit users to seek redress for action the Platforms take that does not seem
to square with their disclosures about their spaces, specifically by maintaining a complaint-and-appeal system for users who believe action contrary to the disclosures has
taken place, id. §§ 120.101-104.
The Platforms’ challenges to these provisions fail under established law. It is
well-established that government can require commercial enterprises to disclose
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“purely factual and uncontroversial information about” their services, so long as the
disclosure would not be “unduly burdensome.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. That is
why a host of well-accepted disclosure rules are constitutional, including disclosures
of “calorie content,” N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114,
136 (2d Cir. 2009) (“NYSRA”); radiation levels, CTIA – The Wireless Ass’n v. City
of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 850-52 (9th Cir. 2019); and a product’s country of origin,
Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014). HB 20 comfortably fits
within this world of accepted disclosure laws.
The district court, however, concluded the law was “inordinately burdensome”
because it could require the Platforms to individually report “billion[s]” of decisions
documenting all of their many censorship and related actions. ROA.2591. This was
wrong in multiple material respects.
B. For starters, the Platforms’ public representations foreclose the argument
that HB 20’s disclosure provisions are “unduly burdensome.” In very recent Congressional testimony, at least some of the Platforms have announced that they would
embrace these requirements. Twitter’s CEO said that “[c]ontent moderation rules
and their potential effects, as well as the process used to enforce those rules, should
be simply explained and understandable by anyone.” Testimony of Jack Dorsey before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation at 2 (Oct. 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3Jnbyrj (“Twitter Testimony”). That is
what HB 20 requires. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.052. Twitter also said that they
“believe that companies like Twitter should publish their moderation process.”
Twitter Testimony at 2. HB 20 requires that, too. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.051.
38

Case: 21-51178

Document: 00516222360

Page: 50

Date Filed: 03/02/2022

And Twitter said that it “believe[s] that all companies should be required to provide
a straightforward process to appeal decisions made by humans or algorithms.” Twitter Testimony at 2. Again, that is exactly what HB 20 requires. Tex. Bus. & Com.
Code §§ 120.101-.104. 21
The Platforms have also boasted that they already do much of what HB 20 requires. For example, HB 20 requires the Platforms to publish a biannual transparency report documenting certain facts about how the Platform managed content during a specific time period, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.053. And the Platforms
showed below that they already materially comply with this: “during 6 months in
2018 alone, Facebook, Google [YouTube’s parent], and Twitter took action on . . . 3
billion cases of spam, 57 million cases of pornography, 17 million cases of content
regarding child safety, and 12 million cases of extremism, hate speech, and terrorist
speech.” ROA.275. Simply publishing those findings goes a long way toward complying with their transparency report obligation under HB 20. The district court also
recognized that the Platforms already perform significant aspects of what HB 20’s

21

To the extent Facebook and YouTube have not made public statements as
clearly in tension with their current litigating position, they should not be permitted
to distance themselves from Twitter’s statements in this suit. They decided to allow
associational representatives to bring this suit for them instead of doing so in their
own right. To establish standing, the associations asserted—as they were required—
that the suit “do[es] not require the participation of” the individual companies, and
“does not require individualized facts about any particular covered social media platform.” ROA.643, ROA.645; see also Tex. Ass’n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm’n, 989 F.3d 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2021) (recognizing these requirements for associational standing). Plaintiffs should not be able to claim now that “individualized
facts” differentiate Facebook and YouTube from Twitter.
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disclosure rules require. ROA.2634 (denying stay pending appeal). It is impossible
to square that reality with the conclusion that requiring these disclosures is “unduly
burdensome.”
C. And, as a matter of law, none of HB 20’s disclosure requirements are “unduly burdensome.” Courts have struck down purely factual disclosures under the
“unduly burdensome” prong in only limited instances—typically where the mandated disclosure would “drown[] out” the party’s ability to proffer its preferred
speech. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018).
For example, a government mandate that a disclosure be appended to an advertisement, and occupy “20%” of the advertisement’s space, may be “unduly burdensome” by swamping too much of the advertiser’s own message. See Am. Beverage
Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 756-57 (9th Cir. 2019). But courts do not
strike down disclosure rules on the ground that the rules would simply require too
much effort, which is essentially what the district court did here. ROA.2591 (district
court concluding HB 20 would require “unfathomably large number” of disclosures).
Further, the district court misunderstood how much work HB 20’s disclosure
rules require.
First, the core HB 20 disclosure requirements direct the Platforms to describe
how they moderate and manage content, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.051, and to
publish an “acceptable use policy” informing users what content is permitted and
how it is policed, id. § 120.052. As a matter of law, these requirements can be satisfied with short, uniform documents disseminated to all users equally. There is no
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meaningful difference between this and nutritional labeling. See NYSRA, 556 F.3d at
134 (“rational basis applies” to this kind of disclosure). Even under the district
court’s flawed legal premise—that disclosures that require too much effort are unduly burdensome—there is no plausible explanation of how these requirements
would be unconstitutional.
Second, HB 20 requires that the Platforms publish a biannual transparency report
documenting certain facts about how the Platform managed content during a specific
time period. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.053. Contrary to the district court’s
misimpression, the Platforms can satisfy this reporting requirement without “unfathomably large” specifics about what happens in their spaces. Instead, the statute
calls for disclosure of top-line numbers describing certain categories of decisions. See
id. § 120.053(a)(1) (“total number of instances . . . ”); id. § 120.053(a)(2) (“number
of instances . . . ”). As noted, the Platforms already do this. See supra at 39. Materially
similar—and even more demanding—reporting requirements, like the SEC’s 10-K
and 10-Q forms, are well-established and do not raise any constitutional problem. See
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“Numerous examples
could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First
Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, [and] corporate
proxy statements.” (citation omitted)).
Third, HB 20 requires that the Platforms maintain a complaint-and-appeal process for users seeking to vindicate the aforementioned disclosures. Tex. Bus. & Com.
Code §§ 120.101-.104. But this is itself not a disclosure requirement at all—it is
standard-fare economic regulation essentially requiring certain minimum standards
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for how businesses treat their clients and is not even subject to the low bar for compelled, truthful disclosures. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955) (rational basis for economic regulations). In essence, it requires the Platforms
to maintain a customer service department. Granted, when customer service representatives interact with customers they speak. But HB 20 does not control the words
that must be spoken, and there is no authority holding that a requirement to maintain
a customer service department is unconstitutional simply because the upshot is that
the customer service representatives will have to speak to customers. Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 456 (“[T]he State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity
deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity.”).

III. The Equitable Factors Favor Lifting the Preliminary Injunction.
All other preliminary injunction factors likewise favor reversal.
The Platforms would not experience material injury from being forced to comply
with HB 20, much less an injury that “outweighs” the harm that would fall on Texas
and its residents. See Atchafalaya, 894 F.3d at 696. For years, the Platforms have
materially and voluntarily complied with the framework the Hosting Rule seeks to
impose on them. See, e.g., supra at 6 (describing the “bait-and-switch” nature of their
recent censorship). So there is little doubt that they have the capacity to easily comply again both technologically and as a matter of business economics. Indeed, some
claim that they still do comply. ROA.1234 (YouTube deponent asserting “[a]ll speakers are treated equally”). The Platforms also have either indicated they want to comply, or already do comply, with essentially everything the disclosure rules require.
See supra at 38-39.
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Texas, on the other hand, experiences harm every day that its law is enjoined.
That is true as a matter of law. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 870 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir.
2017). But the harm here is far worse than usual. The public interest (which merges
here with the government’s injury, see E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760, 770 (5th Cir.
2021)), is overwhelmingly harmed by the injunction. It is instead a public interest of
the “highest order” for persons to have access to a “multiplicity of information
sources.” Turner II, 520 U.S. at 190. And “[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail.” League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 377. None of that
changes simply because the protected speech is offensive. See, e.g., Phelps, 562 U.S.
at 458 (“[S]peech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”); Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43. The public interest also favors truthful disclosures. See CTIA, 928 F.3d at 852 (“disclosure” is in the public interest because it
“furthers, rather than hinders the efficiency of the marketplace of ideas” (alterations
omitted)); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2001)
(same).
But there is a deeper public interest issue in play here. The Platforms invoke
protections that guarantee free speech. See U.S. Const. amend. I (no abridgment of
“freedom of speech”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (Section 230 premised on Congress’s
finding that the Internet “offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse”).
But the Platforms’ arbitrary and inconsistently applied moderation policies violate
fundamental free speech values. See supra at 36-37. And the Platforms’ loudest
champions do not believe in free speech at all. See Mary Anne Franks, The Free Speech
43

Case: 21-51178

Document: 00516222360

Page: 55

Date Filed: 03/02/2022

Black Hole: Can the Internet Escape the Gravitational Pull of the First Amendment?,
Knight

First

Amend.

Inst.

Columbia

Univ.

(Aug.

21,

2019),

https://perma.cc/HAX8-3RZN (First Amendment professor arguing “the First
Amendment presents a problem from its inception” and that the Platforms’ attempts to censor speech “should be celebrated”). The public interest is not served
by the Platforms’ “free speech for me, but not for thee” theory of the public good.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district court’s grant of
a preliminary injunction.
Respectfully submitted.
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